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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

In an effort to find any relevance in the four days of recorded conversations and workshops prior to the pre-sweat lodge orientation, the State has now re-characterized Mr. Ray's supposed crime in a manner that cannot, as a matter of law, support criminal liability. Because this new theory of the case is not legally viable, and because the recordings have no other relevance, the four days of audio tape preceding the pre-sweat lodge orientation must be excluded.

Notwithstanding that the deaths at issue occurred on the afternoon of October 8, 2009, the State now appears to argue that the entire five-day audio recording is relevant because Mr. Ray's criminal conduct is not confined to the afternoon of October 8. See Response at 10. ("Defendant wants the jury to believe his conduct begins - and ends - within a three-hour period. It does not."). Instead, according to the State, Mr. Ray "deployed" "techniques . . . all week in order to persuade the victims and participants to follow his lead and his words." Id. Ultimately, according to the State, the decedents died because they were "fully conditioned" to follow Mr. Ray's encouragement and because "they wanted and desired to live up to Defendant's expectations to stay inside the sweat lodge like a 'warrior' in order to 'live impeccably' and 'with honor." Id. at 7.

This outlandish theory of criminal liability has absolutely no support in any body of law. The State's newly identified *actus reus* thus fails for two reasons. First, it would require this Court to create new criminal law in violation of the Due Process Clause. *See State v. Angelo*, 166 Ariz. 24, 28 (App. 1990) (Due Process requires that individuals have "fair notice that engaging in the proscribed conduct risks criminal penalties"). Second, criminalizing the conduct the State now identifies—words of encouragement—would not only run counter to bedrock notions of causation and human agency, but would violate the Due Process and First Amendment prohibitions against vagueness in the criminal law and punishing protected expression. Because the State's only argument for the recordings' relevance is not a legitimate legal position, this Court should exclude the audio recordings of the four days prior to the afternoon pre-sweat lodge

orientation on October 8 on the ground that they are irrelevant to the crimes of reckless manslaughter and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. See Motion at 1.

I. ARGUMENT

A. To Assert Any Relevance in the Recorded Seminars, the State Has Alleged A Novel and Unworkable Criminal Act.

As explained in the Defense's opening Motion, the four days of recorded workshops and seminars prior to the pre-sweat lodge orientation are not relevant to the charged crimes of reckless manslaughter. The recordings begin on Sunday, October 4, and include literally days of dialogues between Mr. Ray and the seminar participants. The conversations span a wide range of topics, from team-building exercises to discussions of participants' very personal and private issues. There is simply nothing in these extended discussions that could have any bearing on whether Mr. Ray committed the charged crimes of reckless manslaughter on the afternoon of October 8. The State's new argument to the contrary requires it to allege a novel and unworkable criminal act.

Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-201 provides that "[t]he minimum requirement for criminal liability is the performance by a person of conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform a duty imposed by law which the person is physically capable of performing." This provision codifies the very most basic rule of criminal law: that there is no crime without an *actus reus*. See State v. Lara, 183 Ariz. 233, 234 (1995).

But what is the act the State now alleges? The indictment in this case states that Mr. Ray recklessly caused the deaths of three individuals "on or about October 8, 2009." The State now appears to suggest that the direct cause of the deaths that afternoon was volitional conduct by individuals who wanted to "live up to Defendant's expectations," but that Mr. Ray committed a crime by encouraging participants to "live impeccably" in the days before through a series of workshops and discussions modeled after corporate training seminars *See* Response at 7. If this

Conduct is defined as "an act or omission and its accompanying culpable mental state" A R.S §13-

105(6). An "act" is defined as "a bodily movement" Id. §13-105(2), and a "voluntary act" is a bodily

movement performed consciously and as a result of effort and determination, id. 13-105(41).

truly is the State's theory, it raises issues far graver than the admissibility of the audio recordings. As explained below, orally encouraging participants to be their best is not a crime.

B. The Theory of the Case to Which the State Asserts Recordings Are Relevant Would Require This Court to Create New Criminal Law and Violate the Constitution.

The State has identified no case, ever, in any jurisdiction, that hinges criminal liability on mere words of encouragement for a person to be or do their best. The Defense submits that there has never been such a case. Nor would any reasonable person be on notice that encouraging a competent adult to do his or her best is a criminal act. The State's new theory would thus require this Court to create new criminal law in the midst of a prosecution, in violation of the Due Process requirement that individuals have "fair notice that engaging in the proscribed conduct risks criminal penalties." *State v. Angelo*, 166 Ariz. at 28 (citing *Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville*, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)). Nothing in Arizona's criminal statutes or decisional law would give any reasonable person notice that encouraging competent adults to do their best could be a crime.

Furthermore, the novel theory the State now advances in its effort to make the audio recordings relevant would be at loggerheads with Constitutional principles. The void-for-vagueness doctrine under the Due Process Clause "requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." *Kolender v. Lawson*, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). And, subject to narrow exceptions, the First Amendment bars the State from criminalizing expression. *See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul*, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down city's regulation of "hate speech"). Moreover, when a State's criminal law "is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment, the [void-for-vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts." *Smith v. Goguen*, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974). The State's new theory would violate all of these bedrock constitutional principles. Without any precision, definition, or notice, the supposed new crime

1	would punish the expressive act of encouraging others to do good and live well. It would chill the
2	speech of teachers, coaches, and instructors throughout the State.
3	The Court need not take on these weighty constitutional issues at this moment. The
4	reality is that the four days of audio tape that precede the pre-sweat lodge orientation have no
5	relevance whatsoever to the charged crimes of reckless manslaughter on the afternoon of October
6	8, 2009. Only by grossly distorting the nature of the charged crime, and relying on conduct that is
7	not and cannot be criminal, has the State identified any potential relevance in these tapes. The
8	proper course is for this Court to exclude the audio recordings.
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13	DATED: February 26, 2011 MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP
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18	By. C. A. J. A. J. B.
19	Attorneys for Defendant James Arthur Ray
20	Copy of the foregoing delivered this 28 day
21	of February, 2011, to:
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